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I.

Introduction
International shipping accounts for approximately 2-3% percent of global

anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (GHG).1 Under business as usual conditions,
emissions from the sector are expected to double by 2050.2 The quantity of GHG emissions
from shipping combined with the potential for reductions using existing technologies make
the sector a strategic target for mitigation measures.3
In February of 2014, the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law published a white
paper that concluded that sovereign states have broad authority under international law to
regulate GHG emissions from vessels within their registry.4 However, many registries are
structured such that the flag state has limited connection to or exercises limited control over
registered vessels. For example, many flag states franchise their registries to private
corporations that manage the registration of ships. In addition, with the rise of “flags of
convenience,” a number of flag states have only weak ties with ships registered under their
1

Buhang et al., International Marine Organization (IMO), Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships - Second
IMO GHG Study 2009 - Update of the 2000 IMO GHG Study 1 (2009).
2
Pew Center for Climate Change, Climate TechBook: Marine Shipping 1 (Mar. 2010).
3
International Marine Organization (IMO), Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships - Second IMO GHG Study
2009 - Update of the 2000 IMO GHG Study 54 (2009) (finding that improved efficiency through technical and
operational measures could reduce emissions from 25% to 75% of current levels).
4
See Meredith Wilensky, AUTHORITY OF PACIFIC ISLAND STATES TO REGULATE GREENHOUSE GASES FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING SECTOR, SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 26 (February 3, 2014), available
at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/Fellows/ccclshipping_emissions_in_the_pacific_white_paper.pdf.
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flag. This has led to questions as to how the structure of a registry affects states’ capacity to
regulate.
This white paper delves further into the issue of flag state authority to regulate GHG
emissions particularly with respect to franchised registries and flags of convenience. This
white paper assesses how these characteristics may affect the power of states in this regard
and concludes that the presence of an open or franchised registry does not affect regulatory
authority. However, developing nations with limited resources may face challenges
promulgating effective emissions reductions regulations.
II.

Flag State Authority under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
Established in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(“UNCLOS” or the “convention”) was intended to serve as a constitution regulating the
resources and use of the seas.5 The convention represents the input of more than 160
sovereign states in its creation and has been widely ratified since its inception, though,
notably, the United States has not ratified UNCLOS.6 Under UNCLOS, all vessels must
adopt the nationality of a state by registering under and flying a state’s flag.7 The state with
which a vessel is registered is known as the flag state.8
Under UNCLOS, the flag state has principal jurisdiction over all vessels flying its
flag.9 UNCLOS not only permits flag states to regulate flagged vessels, but also obligates
flag states to:
… adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from or through the atmosphere … to vessels flying
their flag or vessels or aircraft of their registry, taking into account

5

Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical
Perspective) (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm.
6
United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Status, available at
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtd
sg3&lang=en (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
7 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) art. 92. 21 ILM 1261 (1982).
8
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, supra note 5.
9
UNCLOS art. 94.
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internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures...10
Since GHGs are atmospheric pollutants, this provision demonstrates that the authority to
regulate GHGs from ships is encompassed within flag state jurisdiction under UNCLOS.
Flag state authority to regulate GHG emissions is further evidenced by the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, known as the MARPOL agreement,
the primary international convention addressing vessel marine pollution.11 The May 2005
amendment to the MARPOL agreement, Annex VI, aims to reduce GHG emissions from
shipping by setting minimum energy efficiency standards for new ships and encourages
improved energy efficiency through fleet efficiency.
UNCLOS gives states discretion to regulate and legislate in the manner they
determine is appropriate as long as regulations do not violate any principle of UNCLOS.12
Thus, a flag state could choose to impose emissions standards, set technological or structural
requirements for flag ships, or employ market mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions.13
States may apply new regulations not only to new ships joining the registry, but also
to ships already flying the state’s flag. A state could ensure that all ships joining the registry
comply with emissions reductions regulation by requiring proof of compliance.14 Flagged
vessels can also be subject to any new conditions imposed by the flag state. For example,
when MARPOL Annex VI was annexed, vessels registered under the flags of the states that
annexed the agreement became subject to the GHG regulations, and flag state became
responsible for implementing these regulations.15
10

UNCLOS art. 212.
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, November 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319
[hereinafter cited as MARPOL], available at
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-thePrevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx.
12
UNCLOS art. 91.
13
See Wilensky, supra note 4, at 26.
14
Sompong Sucharitkul, Liability and Responsibility of the State of Registration or the Flag State in Respect of
Sea-Going Vessels, Aircraft and Spacecraft Registered by National Registration Authorities, 54 AM. J. OF
COMP. LAW 409, 421 (Suppl., Fall 2006).
15
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, MARPOL Annex VI (“Because the United States is subject to the
regulations in MARPOL, “Annex VI enters into force for the United States on January 8, 2009. Starting on that
date, U.S. ships operating anywhere and foreign-flag ships operating in United States waters must comply with
the requirements set out in MARPOL Annex VI.”), available at
https://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/contentView.do?channelId=11
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III.

Regulating Vessels Flagged under FOCs
A.

The Rise of Flags of Convenience under the Law of the Sea

According to UNCLOS, a ship must have a “genuine link” with a state to be granted
the state’s nationality.16 A genuine link can be established through a contractual
agreement or closer ties such as the nationality of the ship’s crew or owner, or the
ship’s origins. The convention does not provide guidance as to what type of link is
“genuine,” and the question has been the subject of substantial debate. Despite efforts
to limit what is considered a genuine link, the term remains ill-defined, allowing ships
substantial flexibility in selecting a flag for registration.17
Since ships must usually pay a fee to join a registry, states have an economic interest in
attracting ships to their flag. The lack of meaningful restrictions in selecting the nationality
for a vessel has allowed for the development of “flags of convenience” (FOCs).18 FOCs take
advantage of the unclear nature of the “genuine link” concept and create low barriers to
registration to build up their registries. These features attract parties seeking convenience, tax
and regulatory benefits, as well as trade opportunities that might otherwise be prohibited for
political reasons.19 Certain flag states may have lower labor, safety, and environmental
standards, affording vessel owners and operators tax and regulatory benefits.20 For example,
the difference in crew costs to operate a modern VLCC-tanker between Liberia, an FOC
state, and Sweden, a non-FOC state, was estimated at 700,000 – 900,000 Euros per year as of

18346&contentId=159304&programId=132092&programPage=%2Fep%2Fprogram%2Feditorial.jsp&pageTyp
eId=13489&contentType=EDITORIAL&BV (last accessed October 17, 2014).
16
UNCLOS art. 91.
17
Brian Baker, Flags of convenience and the gulf oil spill: Problems and Proposed Solutions, 34 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 687, 695 (2012). The International Transportation Workers’ Federation (hereinafter “ITF”) has expressed the
belief that there should be a stronger definition of “genuine link” between a vessel and its flag state; D’Andrea,
Ariella, The “Genuine Link” Concept In Responsible Fisheries: Legal Aspects and Recent Developments, FAO
Legal Papers Online #61, 1 (2006), available at http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/lpo61.pdf.
18
Judith Swan, Fishing Vessels Operating Under Open Registries and the Exercise of Flag State
Responsibilities, FAO FISHERIES CIRCULAR. No. 980. FAO, 2 n. 11 (2002) (“The relevant international
instruments do not provide a legal definition for “open register” or “flag of convenience”), available
atftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y3824e/y3824e00.pdf.
19
Jessica Ferrell, Controlling Flags of Convenience: One Measure to Stop Overfishing of Collapsing Fish
Stocks, 35 ENVTL. L. 323 (2005).
20
Ebere Osieke, Flags of Convenience Vessels: Recent Developments, 73 THE AM. J. OF INT’L L. 1 (1979).
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1999.21 Thus, by reflagging their ships, vessel owners can continue to operate and escape
certain legal requirements.22
To meet the “genuine link” requirement, FOC vessels are often run through a shell
corporation created for the sole purpose of establishing nationality.23 These shell corporations
are easily created online through a registry website.24 FOC registries emphasize ease of
registration, and in many FOC states the registration period can be as little as 24 hours.25
Whether the relationship between the corporation and the flag state creates a “genuine link”
is the subject of debate.26 Critics point out that this system allows vessels to fly the flag of a
state without ever entering its ports. Still, states participating in reflagging maintain that the
practice is within their sovereign power and complies with international law.27
In 1970, the Rochdale Commission, a body commissioned by the British
Government, studied FOC countries and defined six elements common to FOC states:
(1) Non-citizens may own and/or control merchant vessels;
(2) It is easy to join or transfer from the registry. Registration may usually be conducted
at a consulate abroad;
(3) Income taxes are low or not levied at all. There is usually a registration fee and an
annual fee based on tonnage;
21

European Parliament, Directorate General for Research Working Paper on Outflagging and Second Ship
Registers: Their Impact on Manning and Employment, 8 (1999).
22
Louis R. Harolds, Some Legal Problems Arising out of Foreign Flag Operations, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 295,
296 (1959), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol28/iss2/5.
23
Foster Pepper PLLC “Choosing a Vessel Registry” at 1 (2011), available at
http://www.foster.com/pdf/Choosing-a-Vessel-Registry.pdf. Foster Pepper PLLC discusses in a brochure
available to parties seeking to register a vessel the process of forming a single-asset entity to isolate the
shipowner and their assets from liability.
24
International Registries, Inc. “Incorporate Online.” Available at https://www.registeriri.com/index.cfm?action=incorporate. The IRI website is an example of a FOC registry website with easy
access to incorporation materials. The IRI website provides a link on the main page to incorporation, then
provides a simple three step key to incorporating online. There is also a link to an online form. This resource
makes incorporating online easy, and its being paired with the registry services also available on the IRI’s site
make clear that vessel owners seeking to register their ships with the Marshall Islands may also be seeking to
incorporate online in the same transaction.
25
E.g. International Registries, Inc. FAQs: Maritime (“The corporation that operates the Marshall Islands
registry specifies on its website that “a Provisional Certificate of Registration for a vessel may be obtained in
one business day provided that all the required information, proof of ownership and initial registration fees have
been paid.”), available at https://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm?action=page&page=117&fromPage=53.
26
Baker, supra note 17, at 695.
27
Osieke, supra note 20, at 604-05.
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(4) The country of registry is a small power such that registry fees substantially affect the
state’s national income;
(5) Non-nationals may man ships; and
(6) The country of registry has neither the power nor the administrative capacity to
impose regulations or control the registries themselves.28
FOC states often have one or more of the Rochdale criteria, but it is not necessary that they
have all six.29 These criteria reflect the benefits of registering in a FOC state, which center
around the ease of registration and economic and political benefits to flagged vessels.
Examples of FOC states include Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands.30
B.

Quasi-FOCs
While FOCs by their very nature impose little regulation on registered vessels, this

designation does not impact a state’s authority to regulate ships flying its flag. The minimal
regulation of FOCs is in part a choice to encourage ships to join and in part a product of
many developing state’s lack of administrative capacity to effectively impose regulations.
Neither of these reasons inhibits a state’s authority to regulate ships within its registry. Thus,
FOC states are able to adopt international agreements and promulgate national regulations at
will.
In fact, there is precedent for FOC states establishing a higher degree of control.
“Quasi-FOC” states are states that have imposed a level of regulation on their registries
above that which would be expected of a normal FOC state but below that of a traditional
registry.31 One of the most notable quasi-FOC states is Singapore. In 1981, Singapore passed
regulations requiring companies to incorporate in Singapore in order to register their vessels
under its flag and establishing safety and environment requirements, including the adoption

28

David Garfield Wilson. Interdiction on the High Seas: The Role and Authority of a Master in the Boarding
and Searching of his Ship by Foreign Warships, 55 Naval L. Rev. 157, 162-63 (2008).
29
Illiana Christodoulou-Varotsi & Dmitry Pentsov, Maritime Work Law Fundamentals: Responsible
Shipowners, Reliable Seafarer, SPRINGER SCIENCE & BUSINESS MEDIA 17 n. 78 (2007).
30
The International Transport Worker’s Federation, “Flags of Convenience,” available at
http://www.itfglobal.org/en/transport-sectors/seafarers/in-focus/flags-of-convenience-campaign/.
31
Rex Toh and Sock-Yong Phang, Quasi-Flag of Convenience Shipping: The Wave of the Future. 33
TRANSPORTATION J. 31, 35 (1993).
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of MARPOL.32 This regulatory reform was designed to respond to criticism of FOC
registries, but Singapore still retained tax incentives and a relatively low barrier to
registration to maintain the attractiveness of its registry.33 As in the case of Singapore, quasiFOCs tend to balance higher safety standards with tax-benefits and relative ease of entry to
draw registration.
Other flag of convenience states that have imposed regulations on ships include
Honduras, Belize, and Malta.34 Honduras has a requirement that international fishing vessels
cannot fish for tuna before registering to do so; Belize requires applications for vessel
registration to include a fishing vessel data form; and Malta requires vessels to receive
fishing authorization before being registered under its flag.35
C.

Flag-shopping and reflagging
Since FOC states attract ship registration by imposing few regulations, increased

regulation in quasi-FOC states may deter vessels from registering with the state or encourage
registered vessels to transfer to another FOC registry. Flag-shopping is the practice of
seeking states with minimal regulations to evade unfavorable or costly legislation or to
otherwise maximize gains for the vessel owner.36
Because a vessel owner is free to seek out the registry with the most economic and
political benefits,37 increased regulatory standards associated with state’s registry may make
it less attractive than other FOC nations. FOC states encourage this type of movement and
aim to facilitate transfer by keeping registry costs low. Re-domiciliation is the act of
changing the nationality of a corporation to that of new jurisdiction. FOC states facilitate
redomiciliation or construction of shell-corporations to encourage vessels to join their

32

Id. at 34.
Id.
34
See The International Transport Worker’s Federation, supra note 30.
35
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Report of the Expert Consultation on Fishing
Vessels Operating Under Open Registries and Their Impact on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
Appendix F, (September 2003), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y5244e/y5244e00.HTM.
36
Swan supra note 18, at 18.
37
Baker supra note 17, at 696.
33
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registry.38 Not all countries allow redomiciliation.39 However, this does not necessarily
prevent reflagging; it simply incentivizes a corporation to consider more costly methods,
such as creating a new shell corporation in the target flag state instead of redomiciling the
existing corporation. Costs of redomiciliation include new trading certificates, new
classification, insurance, new licenses for officers and crew, possibly the charterer’s consent
to changing the flag (depending on the scheme of ownership and rental).40 In addition, while
vessels can leave registries at will, they may have to pay a fine.41 If costs associated with
transferring registries are less than new regulations, ship owners may be incentivized to leave
a registry. Consequently, emissions regulations may encourage flag shopping and subsequent
registry transfer of vessels.42
For example, after Honduras increased its regulations, its registry diminished to less
than one million tons in 1991.43 In comparison, states with less stringent regulations like
Liberia and Panama had registries with 52.43 gross million tons and 44.95 gross million tons,
respectively.44 On the other hand, more stringent regulations coupled with low taxes and low
barriers to entry can be more attractive to ships that wish to maintain higher operation
quality, especially for newer ships for which compliance is relatively easy in comparison
with older ships that may demand higher costs for refitting antiquated machinery. In addition,
military arrangements between Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and Liberia with the
United States to protect ships, as well as other governmental and economic ties may
discourage redomiciling out of these FOC states.

38

For example, the well-known FOC open registry in Liberia provides free redomiciliation to incoming vessels.
The Liberian Corporate Registry pamphlet, 8. available at http://liberiancorporations.com/wpcontent/files/liberiancorporateregistry.pdf.
39
The Hong Kong and Singapore registries have barriers to redomiciliation.
40
Sucharitkul, supra note 14, at 428.
41
The Liberian Shipping registry specifies that there may be “taxes, fees and expenses in connection with the
deregistration of the vessel from its previous registry.” Liberian Registry, Question Listing for Vessel
Registration, available at
https://www.liscr.com/liscr/Maritime/MaritimeFAQ/VesselRegistration/tabid/109/Default.aspx.
42 See Baker, supra note 17, at 696.
43
Phang, supra note 31, at 34.
44
Id. at 33.
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IV.

Franchised Registries
A.

Franchising Management of Shipping Registries
Registries with low genuine link requirements, including FOCs, are more often found

in developing countries. Since these states often have less capacity to handle wide-scale
business with vessels wishing to operate under their flag, states sometimes “franchise” out
the state flag to a corporation.45 The corporation then has the duty of taking the registrations
of vessels and flagging the vessels under the registry’s contracted flag. Registries are
franchised through an act of parliament that gives the registry company exclusive rights to
the state flag.46 The franchising corporation is usually based in a different state than the state
whose flag they have franchised, but the registry and flagged vessels are subject to the rules
and regulations for registration in the flag state.47 States that have franchised out their
registry to a commercial entity include Liberia, RMI, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Vanuatu.
Liberia was the first major FOC country to franchise its flag. As one journalist
referred to the practice, Liberia “outsource[d] the marketing of its sovereignty to a private
American corporation.”48 The Liberian registry was originally formed in 1948 under the
name The Liberia Company, which later developed into International Registries, Inc (IRI).
Former Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and a larger group of leading American
entrepreneurs and politicians who were seeking to create a registry with extremely low vessel
taxes and barriers to registration were instrumental in the creation of the registry.49 The
agreement allowed Liberia to receive 40% of the corporation’s revenue.

45

Swan, supra note 18, at 20.
The RMI has an agreement with their registry through an agreement with parliament. The 1990 Marshall
Islands Maritime Act (MI-107), a joint partnership parliamentary act created by the RMI government in
affiliation with IRI and The Trust Company for the Marshall Islands, Inc, details maritime law and procedure in
the state, available at http://www.register-iri.com/forms/upload/MI-107.pdf.
47
UNCLOS art. 94.
48
Khadija Sharife, Flying a Questionable Flag: Liberia’s Lucrative Shipping Industry, 27 WORLD POL’Y J.116
(Winter 2010/2011).
49
H. Edwin Anderson, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics and
Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 159 (1996).
46
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The RMI registry was franchised to IRI after Liberia regained control of its registry.50
The IRI is currently based out of Virginia.51 The RMI offers unique benefits to vessels
registering under its flag, including zero taxes easy and quick incorporation procedures, and
redomiciliation into and out of the RMI’s jurisdiction – all attractive qualities to vessels
looking to minimize costs and exert minimal efforts in registration.52

B.

Regulating Vessels Registered under a Franchised Flag
Franchising a registry does not impinge on a state’s right to regulate vessels flying its

flag. While the corporation manages the registry, the flag state retains jurisdiction under
UNCLOS and thus has the power to regulate registered vessels.53 RMI exercised such
authority by adopting MARPOL, including Annex VI concerning the Prevention of Air
Pollution by Ships.54 Upon ratification of the annex, RMI notified shipowners, operators,
masters, officers of merchant ships, and recognized organizations that it would implement the
agreement.55 The notice released by the IRI details methods by which MARPOL can be
followed and lays out compliance procedures and standards for vessel owners.
Once a flag state with a franchised registry implements new requirement for registered
vessels, the registry may enforce those standards through requiring proof of compliance for
registration. For example, the IRI registry requires proof of liability insurance, including oil
pollution and bunker pollution.56 It is not clear, however, what obligation the registry has to
otherwise ensure compliance with regulations. This duty would likely be stipulated in the
contract between the flag state and the franchising corporation.

50

See discussion infra Part C.
International Registries, Inc. webpage, available at http://www.registeriri.com/index.cfm?action=page&page=107.
52
Id.
53
UNCLOS art. 94, specifying that “Every state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administration, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.”
54
IMO Documentation on MARPOL PROT 1997, (November 2014), available at
https://imo.amsa.gov.au/public/parties/marpol97prot.html.
55
Republic of the Marshall Islands Office of the Maritime Administrator, Implementation of MARPOL Annex
VI, Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships, available at https://www.registeriri.com/forms/upload/MN-2-013-8.pdf.
56
International Registries, Inc. Maritime Services: Vessel Registration, available at http://www.registeriri.com/index.cfm?action=page&page=53&fromPage=5.
51
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C.

Regaining Control of a Franchised Registry
Just as a parliament permits the franchising of a registry through an act of parliament,

the parliament may abolish a franchise agreement by repealing the act. States that have
regained control from franchised registries include Liberia and Cambodia. With respect to
Liberia, it is not clear whether IRI or Charles Taylor, then President of Liberia, initiated the
switch.57 IRI had administered the Liberian registry until Liberia transferred control to an
alternative U.S. based company.58 Since breaking the contract with IRI, Liberia still has the
second largest flag of convenience registry in the world.59
Cambodia also cancelled its contract with the Cambodia Shipping Corporation
(CSC), a Singapore-based private corporation.60 According to some reports, international
allegations of drug transportation surrounding Cambodian flagged vessels sparked
controversy in the early 2000’s and placed pressure on the Cambodian government to take
action against the registry.61 When more allegations arose in 2002, the Cambodian Prime
Minister revoked the license and authority of the CSC to manage the registry.62 The New
York Times reported a slightly different story, stating that Cambodia canceled the right of its
Singapore agents to register ships after discovering the extent of disrepair of ships within the
registry and after France accused a Cambodian-registered ship and its crew of transporting
cocaine.63 Either way, control of the registry was transferred to a new registry created in
cooperation with the South Korean Cosmos Group and Cambodian government.64

57

According to multiple news sources and articles, Taylor dropped IRI after it failed to comply with demands to
divert greater sums of revenue to finance the civil war Taylor had launched. Sharife, supra note 48, AT 116.
58
Swan, supra note 18, at n.179.
59
International Maritime Organization, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING FACTS AND FIGURES- INFORMATION
RESOURCES ON TRADE, SAFETY, SECURITY, ENVIRONMENT, Maritime Knowledge Center (March 2012),
available at
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/TheRoleandImportanceofInternatio
nalShipping/Documents/International%20Shipping%20-%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf.
60
FLAG STATE REPORT—CAMBODIA. SEAFARER’S INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH CENTER 83 (2003), available at
http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/uploads/cambodia2003.pdf.
61
Michael Richardson, Cambodia-listed ship was Carrying Cocaine: Raid at Sea Highlights Flag Abuses, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (June 24, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/24/news/24iht-a5_64.html.
62
Seng Sokthary, Cambodia Ship Registry, Cambodia Inland Waterway Navigation Ministry of Public Works
and Transit, available at http://www.ciwn.mpwt.gov.kh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72.
63
Keith Bradsher, North Korean Ploy Masks Ships Under Other Flags, The New York Times (October 20,
2006). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/20/world/asia/20shipping.html?_r=0.
64
Sokthary, supra note 63.
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Cambodia and Liberia likely demonstrate that FOCs can cancel contracts franchising
their registry, but it may be the case that the suspected illegal activity allowed the Cambodian
government to escape the terms of the existing contract or the political instability in Liberia
made abiding by contractual obligations infeasible. Regardless, FOC governments should be
able to repeal legislation allowing the franchise of their registry. Depending on the terms of
the franchise agreements, however, repudiation of the contract may leave the governments at
risk of liability for violation of terms of the contract. A contract could limit the circumstances
under which the state has the right to cancel the franchise. Without access to the terms of the
contract, this risk cannot be assessed. It is also possible that the contract could stipulate that
the country must buy back the registry at the time of cancellation. This could be
accomplished directly or through contracting with an outside corporation more amenable to
the flag state.
Where a state regains control of its registry, the franchising corporation may choose
to move their registry to a new FOC state. Since registering with a state requires domicile (to
establish a genuine link) and following the standards of that state, if a registry were to move
to another nation the ships would still be legally registered with the former FOC state. The
only way for the vessels themselves to move with the registry would be for them to
redomicile and reflag under the state to which the registry moved.65 For example, when
Liberia took back its registry, IRI contracted to franchise the RMI registry. However, the
massive Liberian registry of ships stayed with the state under new management, the Virginiabased Liberian International Ship & Corporate Registry.66
If a state did take back over its registry, it could remain an open registry. In fact,
Malta and Cyprus both have state-owned open registries. One potentially negative
consequence of taking control of a registry is that the state-owned registry would not have
the wealth of resources and multiple global office locations that large companies like IRI use
to attract new vessel owners.67 Nonetheless, low costs and ease of registration may be more
65

UNCLOS art. 92 (“A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case
of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.”).
66
Liberian Registry, “Points to Compare,” available at
https://www.liscr.com/liscr/AboutUs/AboutLiberianRegistry/PointstoCompare/tabid/214/Default.aspx.
67
For example, IRI claims that their “worldwide network of Nautical Inspectors conducts in-port inspections
and responds to shipowner and operator needs” and that their “decentralized operations provide customers with
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important to vessel owners than the entity maintaining the registry. Moreover, a reduction in
the size of a state’s registry may be offset by the state’s increased profit share compared with
a franchise agreement.
D.

Potential Liability for Flag Ships

One concern for states considering regaining control of their registry is that they might
become liable for insufficient regulation or lack of enforcement should a ship flying its flag
cause damage. However, taking control of a registry is unlikely to impact risk of liability for
FOC states.
Under UNCLOS, states have a duty to regulate vessels registered under their flag.
However, risk of liability for lack of regulation appears relatively low in practice. President
Obama called the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010 the worst environmental disaster in
U.S. history.68 The oil rig involved in the disaster was registered under the RMI flag. While
the disaster resulted in thousands of lawsuits, no cases were filed against RMI. One reason
may be that the RMI simply does not have the deep pockets to make such litigation
worthwhile, especially when BP and other multinational corporations are alternative
defendants. RMI’s duty to regulate ships registered under its flag exists regardless of whether
it has franchised control of the registry. Consequently, there is little reason to believe that
RMI would have been sued if it had control over its registry.
Similarly, state control of its registry is unlikely to affect liability based on the state’s
failure to enforce international law. Flag states have a duty to conform with generally
accepted international standards in terms of safety, pollution, design, and communication, as
well as any other normally accepted standard for vessels under UNCLOS. States may be
liable for breaching these obligations.69 Flag states that are “grossly and persistently” non-

24-hour service from IRI's 26 worldwide offices in Asia, Europe and the United States International Registries,
Inc.” Maritime Services: Unique Advantages, available at https://www.registeriri.com/index.cfm?action=page&page=44.
68
Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill.
69
UNCLOS art. 94 (detailing the duties of the flag state and the standards of enforcement of provisions under
UNCLOS).
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compliant with their duties are subject to suspension of normal privileges.70 The duty to
enforce international standards is not waived because a state has franchised its registry. Thus,
it should not impact potential liability to subsume control of the registry. Moreover, the risk
of liability is low to begin with, because there is no generally accepted standard for
registration of vessels and no uniformity in controls between nations.71 The high degree of
variability among states means that flag states are not usually found legally responsible for
non-compliance.72
V.

Enforcement
The easiest way for a flag state to ensure compliance with new regulatory

requirements is to require proof of compliance at the time of registration. This method,
however, does not address compliance for vessels that are already in the registry when the
regulations are developed. Enforcement of these vessels can be difficult because ships can be
anywhere across the globe.
One potential means of enforcement is to ensure compliance of those ships their flag
that enter the state’s ports.73 When ships enter a state’s port, the state has authority under
UNCLOS to investigate and prosecute offenses committed outside areas of the state’s coastal
jurisdiction under certain conditions.74 However, this may only account for a small portion of
ships within a given registry, especially in FOC states, since the basis for a ship’s genuine
link is often minimal.
Regional action may improve enforcement capacity. Port state authority under
UNCLOS applies to both foreign and domestic ships.75 In practice, port state controls have
proven to be a common enforcement mechanism in a number of international agreements

70

UNCLOS art. 185 (“A State Party which has grossly and persistently violated the provisions of this Part may
be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Council.”).
71
While thorough research did not uncover examples of flag state responsibility, the potential still remains. See
Sucharitkul, supra note 14, at 421.
72
Id.
73
UNCLOS art. 218.
74
Michelle Cuttler, Incentive for Reducing Oil Pollution from Ships: The Case for Enhanced Port State
Control, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 192 (1995).
75
UNCLOS art. 218.
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pertaining to shipping.76 Since climate change poses a substantial threat to all Pacific island
states, these nations may benefit from a regional agreement to set GHG standards and to
enforce these standards across all ports. This could be an attractive proposal as port states
have a strong economic interest in encouraging shipping and will want to ensure regulations
do not hinder maritime trade.77 Further, the more states that impose similar provisions, the
less opportunity there is for flag-shopping or reflagging for ships looking to avoid new
regulations.
VI.

Conclusion
Flag states have principal authority over ships in their registry and, as such, have

wide discretion to regulate GHG emissions of ships registered under their flag. Such
legal authority applies to all states regardless of status as a FOC state or the decision to
franchise the registry. Still, FOC states and franchised registries may face practical
obstacles in promulgating and enforcing GHG emissions regulations. In the case of FOC
states, more stringent regulations may make a FOC state’s registry less attractive and
lead to a reduction in the size of the registry. In addition, limited resources may make it
difficult to properly ensure compliance with regulations.
Franchised registries must consider the willingness or duty of the company
managing the registry to ensure compliance. Depending on the state’s contract with the
registry, it may be preferable to regain control of the registry. While the flag state has
legal authority to cancel the agreement franchising the registry, it may face a monetary
penalty or be required to buy back the registry depending on the terms of the
contractual agreement. This price may be worthwhile, as it would secure for the state
total control over ships within its registry and full proceeds from ship registration and
fees. In sum, states wising to regulate have many options but must plan strategically to
overcome challenges in terms of efficacy and enforceability.
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